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PRIVACY IS THE PROBLEM
Raymond Shih Ray Ku'
A local school district remotely activates laptop web cameras
that allegedly record the activities of students, even in their
1
bedrooms. The President authorizes the National Security Agency
(NSA)
to monitor
the telephone
calls and electronic
communications of individuals within the United States on an
unprecedented scale in the interest of national security.' Even a
cursory examination of the news suggests that the activities and
communications
of Americans are increasingly subject to
government
surveillance from every level of government.
Whatever we may think about the necessity for this surveillance,
we should question how such programs come into being; in other
words, who made the decision to use web cameras or wiretap
international communications and how was that decision made and
how did the government decide when to turn on a particular web
camera or to monitor a particular telephone call or e-mail? And, for
the purposes of this discussion, what does the United States
Constitution have to say about both of these processes?
Currently, whether government may engage in surveillance
under the Constitution or whether the Constitution shields
individuals from such surveillance turns on whether courts will

• Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Center for Law, Technology &
the Arts, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. This essay draws
heavily from my prior work, The Founders' Privacy: The Fourth Amendment
and the Power of Technological Surveillance, with permission of the Minnesota
Law Review. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders' Privacy: The Fourth
Amendment and the Power of Technologicol Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV.
1325 (2002).
I Maryclaire
Dale, Official: FBI Probing Pa. School Webcam Spy Case,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 19, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/TechnologylWire
Story?id=9890037.
2 See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets
Spy on Callers Without
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A.!. See generally OFFICES OF
INSPECTORSGEN, OF THE DEP'T OF DEf. ET AL., UNCLASSlffEDREPORTON THE
PRESIDENT'S
SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAM
(2009),
available
at
http://www,dni.gov/reports/report_071309.pdf
[hereinafter
SURVEILLANCE
REPORT] (reviewing President Bush's surveillance program).
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recognize that the individual subject of the surveillance has a
reasonable expectation of privacy.' If there is such an expectation,
then the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
applies and the surveillance may only occur if it satisfies the
requirements of the Warrant Clause4 If not, then the government's
power is essentially limitless, subject only to the discretion of the
government agent and the executive branch, at least as far as the
Constitution is concerned. 5
For example, in defending the legality of the President's
Surveillance Program, in which President George W. Bush
authorized the NSA to intercept telephone and Internet
communications between individuals within the United States and
abroad, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) argued that the Fourth
Amendment did not apply because there was no reasonable
expectation of privacy in such communications in light of the
government's interest in protecting national security, which easily
outweighed any individual privacy interests.? Likewise, courts are
currently divided over whether the government should be required
to obtain a warrant in order to acquire information from cellular
providers that would allow the government to ?inpoint the physical
location of individual cellular telephones.
Once again, the
government argues that warrants are not required because cellular

] See generally Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders' Privacy: The
Fourth Amendment and the Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN, L.
REv. 1325, 1343-56 (2002) (discussing modern technology and its implications
on Fourth Amendment rights).
4 U,S, CONST. amend. IV.
5 Ku, supra note 3, at 1357-62 (discussing
a lack of the Fourth
Ame~dment's role and the substitute discretion to law enforcement).
SURVEILLANCEREpORT,supra note 2, at 12-13 (discussing Memorandum
from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. to John Ashcroft, Attorney
Gen., Op. Off. Legal Counsel 131 (Nov. 2, 2001) [hereinafter OLC 131]); see
also Enc Posner & John Yoo, The Patriot Act Under Fire, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9,
2003, at A.26.
7 See generally In re U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider
of Elec.
Commc'n Servo to Disclose Records to the Gov't (In re U.S), 534 F. Supp. 2d
585
Pa, 2008), aff'd, No. 07-524M, 2008 WL 419151 I (W,D, Pa. Sept.
10, 2008) (citing several cases related to the constitutional dispute regarding the
Issue).
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telephone users have no reasonable expectation of privacy in this
information.8 Under this approach, privacy is the problem.
I. PRIVACY Is OVERPROTECTlVE

In one sense, privacy is the problem because assertions of a
right to privacy are perceived or portrayed as standing in the way
of legitimate efforts to protect the public from crime or from
terrorism. Rhetorically, privacy is often framed as a right to deny
government access to relevant information. And the critique of
privacy is often framed by the question: If YOLJ are innocent, what
do you have to hide? While some, myself included, will agree with
Benjamin Franklin that" '[t]hey who can give up essential liberty
to obtain a little tempora7 safety, deserve neither liberty nor
safety,' " others will not. And, when the government seeks
information relevant to protecting the public, it should come as no
surprise that judges are reluctant to conclude that even a legitimate
expectation of privacy is insufficient to deny government access to
that information.l" So if the Fourth Amendment is intended to
protect privacy, judges often have difficulty concluding that the
Fourth Amendment should apply. I I This is a binary world in which
recognizing a right of privacy is portrayed as necessarily
sacrificing some degree of public safety and security. This is
clearly the thrust of the OLC's reading of the Fourth Amendment
with respect to the President's Surveillance Program: if we protect
individual privacy, lives will be put at risk, and that is a trade-off
that the Constitution does not require us to make. 12 In other words,

us., 534 F. Supp. 2d at 613-14.
1 BENJAMINFRANKLIN& WILLIAMTEMPLEFRANKLIN,MEMOIRSOF THE
LIFE ANDWRITINGSor BENJAMINFRANKLIN270 (London, A.I. Valpy 1818).
to See, e.g., UniIed States v. Goldstein, 635 F.2d 356, 361 n.6 (5th Cir.
1981) (citation omitted) (recognizing a relaxed standard of reasonableness when
public safety is at risk).
11 See id. Of course, this overlooks the fact that even when framed in tenus
of privacy, the Fourth Amendment does not deny government access to relevant
information, but instead requires the govenunent to demonstrate to an
independent decision maker that it is seeking information relevant to public
safety. See, e.g., id.
12 See SURVEILLANCEREpORT, supra note 2, at 13 (discussing OLC 131,
supra note 6); see also Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 2, at A.!.
'In re
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for those interested in public safety, privacy is a problem because it
stands in the way of (and should give way to) effective law
enforcement.
II. PRlVACY

Is UNDER-PROTECTIVE

Ironically, privacy is also the problem for those interested in
protecting privacy. Rather than treating privacy as an underlying
interest protected by the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court of
the United States currently uses it as a limiting principle,
narrowing the scope and circumstances in which the Amendment
applies. For most of the twentieth century, the right of privacy
protected by the Amendment was only implicated when the search
conducted by the government invaded privacy in a manner
equivalent to the types of searches that troubled the Framers of the
Constitution. [3 As Anthony Amsterdam described years ago:
[this] approach proceeds from the premise that the fourth
amendment is addressed essentially to the forcible rummagings
of the English messengers and colonial customs officers. It
concedes that the amendment extends to similar cases,
identifies the relevant attributes of similarity, and ends by
asking whether the police practice now in issue is sufficiently
similar to the messengers' and customs officers' rummagings in
the relevant regards. 14
As advances in technology make it possible for government to
gather information without having to trespass on property,
rummage through drawers, or open locked cabinets, the Supreme
Court has often concluded that the searches made possible by new
technology are not equivalent to the searches the Framers feared
and, tberefore, are not searches subject to the Fourth Amendment.
Consider the Supreme Court's decisions in United States v.
Knotts 15 and United States v. Karo" in which the Court

13 But see generally Kyllo v. UnitedStates, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding
that using technologynot commonlyavailableto the public, such as thermal

imaging, to peer inside the home is considered a search).
14 Anthony G. Amsterdam,Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment 58
L. REV. 349, 363 (1974).

MrNN.
IS

UnitedStatesv. Knotts,460 U.S.276 (1983).

'
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considered whether using electronic tracking devices constituted a
search under the Fourth Amendment. In Knotts, the police placed a
"beeper," or radio transmitter, in a five-gallon drum of
chlorofonn.l Using the beeper, they were able to track the drum
from its place of purchase in Minnesota to the Knotts' cabin in
Wisconsin in which they discovered a drug laboratory. IS In
upholding the warrantless use of the beeper, the Supreme Court
concluded that the information provided by the beeper was no
different than what the officers could have observed visually."
Accordingly, "[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the
police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them
at birth with such enhancement as science and technology afforded
them in this case.,,20 In contrast, government agents in Karo used a
beeper to track fifty gallons of ether, not only on public roads but
within specific residences." The Court began by describing private
residences as "places in which the individual normally expects
privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a
warrant. ,,22 It then held that monitoring of the beeper within private
residences violated the Fourth Amendment because it allowed the
government "to obtain information that it could not have obtained
by observation from outside the curtilage of the house. ,,23
Another illustration of this approach and its formalistic
reliance on "public exposure" can be found in Smith v. Maryland."
In Smith, a victim of a robbery received threatening and obscene
telephone calls from an individual "identifying himself as the
robber. ,,25 When police subsequently identified Smith as fitting the
robber's description, they had the telephone company install a pen
26
register to record the phone numbers dialed by Smith.
The

United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277.
18 Id at 278-79.
19 td. at 282.
20 Id.
21 Karo, 468 U.S. at 708.
22 !d. at 714.
2] Id. at715.
24 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
2S!d. at 737.
26 Id.
16

17
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register revealed that Smith subsequently called the victim
In
holding that the use of the pen register was not a search, the Court
concluded that Smith had no reasonable expectation of privacy in
the numbers he dialed because his use of the phone "voluntarily
conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and
'exposed' that information to its equipment in the ordinary course
of business.t''" Not only was the information collected by the pen
registry more limited than that collected ~~ wiretaps, it did not
divulge the contents of the commurucanon.
Having thus exposed
this information, the Court concluded that Smith " 'assumed the
risk' " that the telephone company might turn this information over
to the police" The Court reached this conclusion by defining
away, rather than examining, the privacy interests at stake." As
such, while the Supreme Court may interpret the Fourth
Amendment as protecting privacy with respect to emerging
technologies, this approach leaves open the possibility that, despite
the information-gathering capabilities of these technologies, their
use may not be regulated at all under the Constitution. This is
because, semantically, the Court may not consider their use to be a
search. As others have noted, "[t]his approach fails to protect
privacy rights, and permits their gradual decay with each improved
technological advance. ,,32

27

28

Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.
Id. at 744.

29 Id. at 741 ("[AJ pen register differs significantly
from the listening
device employed in Katz, for pen registers do not acquire the contents of

communications. '').
30

Jd. at 744.

31

See id.

32 Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation of the Value and Means Models of the
Fourth Amendment in the Age of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance, 39
SYRACUSEL. REV. 647, 650 (1988) (citations omitted); see also Lewis R. Katz,
In Search of a Fou~th Amendment for the Twenty-First Century, 65 IND. L.J.

549, 554 (1990) ~~otmg that the Court has applied the reasonable expectation of
pnvacy standard to reduce rather than enhance fourth amendment protections");
David E. Steinberg, Making Sense of Sense-Enhanced Searches, 74 MiNN. L.
REV. 563, 565, 613-27 (1990) (criticizing the incoherence of the Supreme
Court's sense-enhanced search cases and suggesting three factors that may better
protect Fourtb Amendment pnvacy). See generally Timothy Casey Electronic
Surveillance and the Right to be Secure, 41 U.c. DAVIS L. REV. '977 (2008)
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POWER, NOT PRIVACY

More importantly, privacy is the problem because, as I have
argued elsewhere, "[t]he Fourth Amendment protects power not
privacy.v? By its terms, the Amendment protects "[t]he right of
the people to be secure. ,,34 While privacy is certainly an interest
that falls within a right to be secure, it is not mentioned in the text,
nor was it the primary motivation for the Amendment's adoption.
As such, protecting privacy was not and should not be considered
the Amendment's primary purpose, and determining whether a
right to privacy is invaded should not be our focus or the
dispositive question.
Moreover,
the Supreme Court's focus upon privacy
undermines the right to be secure because, under the Court's
current interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, privacy is an
arbitrary, limiting concept that does not limit abusive government
power as much as it limits the circumstances
in which
constitutional safeguards are applied to government surveillance.
In other words, if a court decides that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy from a particular form of surveillance, the
Constitution has nothing to say about the matter. As I have argued
elsewhere, privacy is a problem under these circumstances because
it undermines the very purpose behind the Fourth Amendment in
particular, and behind the Constitution in general-ensuring that the
people determine what power the government may exercise and
how that power should be exercised."
According to conventional wisdom, the Fourth Amendment
embodies the Founders' concerns over general warrants and writs
of assistance, as illustrated by three preconstitutional search and
seizure cases." Wilkes v. Wood." Entick v. Carringtoni" and the

(discussing recent developments in electronic surveillance and the Fourth
Amendment).
33 Ku, supra note 3, at 1326.
34 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
35 See Ku, supra note 3, passim.
36 See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463 (1928) ("The
well known historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment [was] directed against

general warrants and writs of assistance .. , ."). There is some debate over the
relative importance of the writs of assistance. Compare AKHILREED AMAR, THE
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Writs of Assistance Case39 These decisions are important because
of two connecting themes: (I) concern about the privacy of an
individual's home and papers against the government and (2) a
4o
staunch rejection of unbridled official power and discretion.
For
example, the Wilkes case arose in response to efforts to punish
John Wilkes, a well-known member of Parliament, for seditious
libel as the author of a series of anonymously published pamphlets
that were critical of King George III.41 Lord Halifax, the British
Secretary of State, issued a warrant that did not name Wilkes or
any other individual by name, but instead directed officials "to
make strict and diligent search for the authors, printers and
publishers of a seditious and treasonable paper" and "to apprehend
and seize, together with their papers.v" The officials carrying out
the warrant arrested Wilkes and forty-nine other suspects by
breaking into their homes and seizing their personal papers.i'
In response, Wilkes and several of the other suspects
challenged their arrest by bringing trespass actions against the

BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATIONANDRECONSTRUCTION
66 n* (1998) ("The Boston
writs of assistance case ... played very little role in the discussion leading up to
the Fourth Amendment"), with Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197,223-28 (1993) (arguing that
the disputes over writs of assistance played an important role in colonial
understanding of unreasonable searches and seizures). Because my argument
does not depend upon the proper resolution of this debate, I include the Writs of
Assistance Case in this discussion. See William J. Stuntz, The Substantive
Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE LJ. 393, 396-97 & n.9 (1995)
(citations omitted) (treating "the Boston Writs of Assistance Case" as part of the
Fourth Amendment canon despite this debate).
37 Wilkes v. Wood, 19 Howell's State Trials 1153 (C.P. 1763), 98 Eng.
Rep. 489.
38 Emick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (C.P. 1765),95 Eng.
Rep. 807.
39 See M.H. SMlTH, THE WRlTS OF ASSISTANCECASE 524, at app. C
(1978).
40 Stuntz, supra note 36, at 399-400, 406-08 (discussing these two themes
that emerged from the cases).
:; Wilkes, 19 Howell's State Trials at 1159-61, 98 Eng. Rep. at 493-94.
In re Wilkes, 19 Howell's State Trials 981, 981 (C.P. 1763),95 Eng.
Rep. 737, 737.
43 See Wilkes, 19 Howell's State Trials at 1153,98 Eng. Rep. at 493-94; see
also Stuntz, supra note 36, at 399 (citations omitted).
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In Wilkes, Chief Justice
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Pratt instructed

the

The defendants claimed a right, under precedents, to force
persons' houses, break open escrutores, seize their papers ...
upon a general warrant ... and therefore a discretionary power
given to messengers to search wherever their suspicions may
chance to fall. If such a power is truly invested in a secretary of
state, and he can delegate this power, it certainly may affect the
person and property of every man in this kingdom, and is
totally subversive of the liberty of the subject."
The jury found for Wilkes, awarding
him one thousand
pounds in damage.i" and in a separate suit against Lord Halifax,
Wilkes was awarded an additional four thousand pounds." As
William Stuntz notes, the cases arising out of these arrests "stand
for the proposition that [general] warrants are invalid ... and that
arrests must be grounded in some cause to suspect the arrestee
personally
of a crime.,,48 To the extent that the Wilkes decision
influenced the Founders, it suggests that the Fourth Amendment
was adopted as a means of restraining official discretion. As the
Chief Justice emphasized in his jury instruction, the question raised
by the case is whether anyone in government has the power "to
search wherever their suspicions may chance to fall.,,49
The concern over official discretion was similarly echoed with
respect to writs of assistance. In the seventeenth
and eighteenth
centuries, British statutes gave customs officials virtually unlimited
authority to search for and to seize goods in violation of existing
trade rules." These writs of assistance did not grant the authority

Wilkes, 19 Howell's State Trials at 1153, 98 Eng. Rep. at 493-94.
451d. at 1167, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498.
461d. at 1168, 98 Eng. Rep. at 499.
47 Stuntz, supra note 36, at 399 (citation omitted).
48 ld. at 400 (citations omitted); see also Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S.
79, 84 (1987) (noting that the prohibition of general warrants was one of the
central purposes ofthe Fourth Amendment); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
583-85 (1980) (stating a similar proposition).
49 Wilkes, 19 Howell's State Trials at 1167,98 Eng. Rep. at 498.
so For example, the Act of Frauds of 1662 authorized customs officers "to
44

enter, and go into any House, Shop, Cellar, Warehouse or Room, or other Place,
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to search; "rather, they enabled customs officers to compel
others-constables,
local officials, or even private citizens-to
assist in carrying out the necessary searches and seizures.,,51
Nonetheless, as Stuntz notes, because they permitted searches
based only upon the suspicion of the customs officer, "the writs
became wrapped up with the search authority they sought to
confirm."s2 As another commentator observes, much like tbe
general warrant, "[t]he odious features of writs of assistance were
the unbridled discretion given public officials to choose targets of
the searches [and] the arbitrary invasion of homes and offices to
execute the writs. ,,53
Consider James Otis's now famous argument against the writs.
According to Otis:
A man's house is his castle; and while he is quiet, he is as well
guarded as a prince in his castle. This writ, if it should be
declared legal, would totally annihilate this privilege. Custom
house officers may enter our houses when they please-we are
commanded to permit their entry-their menial servants may
enter-may break locks, bars and every thing in their way-and
whether they break through malice or revenge, no man, no
court can inquire-bare suspicion without oath is sufficient. 54
While Otis rhetorically invokes the right of privacy with his
reference to tbe sanctity of the home, this right is clearly not
absolute. The home is considered a castle only so long as the
55
individual is "quiet" in it. This concession is quite appropriate

and in Case of Resistance,to break open Doors, Cbests, Trunks and otber
Package, there to seize, and from thence to bring, any Kind of Goods or
Merchandize whatsoever, prohibited and uncustomed."
25

SMITH,

supra note 39, at

(quotingACT OF FRAUDS § 5(2) (1662».
" Stuntz,supra note 36, at 405.
52

!d.

Shirley M. Hufstedler,Invisible Searches for intangible Things:
Regulation of Governmental information Gathering, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1483,
53

1487 (1979).
54JAMES OTlS, ADDRESS, in SMlTH,
supra note 39, at 344. Put anotherway,
the writs place "the libertyof every man in the handsof everypetty officer."Id.
at 331.
55 See id. at 331 .
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and reasonable. Aside from questioning the validity of the
underlying substantive crime, it is difficult to imagine any value
that would justify an absolute right to hide evidence of a crime. 56
Accordingly, the problem with the writs was not the invasion of
the castle, which is how privacy is commonly conceived, but with
the process justifying the invasion. The writs gave customs officers
and their "menial servant[s]" the right to enter any home whenever
they pleased. 57 The "liberty" Otis so eloquently argued for was not
an absolute right of privacy, however defined. Instead, his liberty
is the liberty recognized in Wilkes-freedom from arbitrary and
unlimited government power.
The relative importance of limiting governmental power
and discretion versus defining what is private is apparent when one
considers that only one of the cases in the triumvirate turned on an
absolute right to keep information from the government. Like
Wilkes, John Entick authored a series of pamphlets that authorities
considered libelous. 58 Unlike the warrant in Wilkes, this was not a
general warrant because Entick was specifically named.t"
Nonetheless, Entick sued in trespass and was awarded three
hundred pounds.i" In upholding the jury's verdict, Pratt, who at this
time was known as Lord Camden, concluded that" [p]apers are the
owner's goods and chattels: they are his dearest property; and are
so far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an
inspection.t'" Despite the fact that the government had obtained a
valid warrant, the court concluded that searching and seizing of
papers themselves was impermissible.
While the decision in Entick clearly recognizes the private
nature of papers, most of Pratt's decision is spent questioning the
authority and process by which the warrant was issued. In

56 As Professor Stuntz has argued, Wilkes and Entick were essentially First
Amendment cases in a regime in which there was not opportunity for direct
substantive review. Stuntz, supra note 36, at 403.
57 See Wilkes v. Wood, 19 Howell's State Trials 1153, 1165 (C.P. 1763),

98 Eng. Rep. 489.
58 Entick v. Carrington,

19 Howell's State Trials 1029, 1031 (C.P. 1765),

95 Eng. Rep. 807, 808.
"Id at 1033-34,95 Eng. Rep. at 809-10.
60 See id. at 1036, 95 Eng, Rep. at 811.
61 !d. at 1066.
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affirming the trespass verdict, Entick rejected the power and
authority of the Secretary to issue a lawful warrant as well as the
lawfulness of the process by which the warrant was issued and
executed"
Criticizing the power of the Secretary of State as
"pretty singular.t''" he rejected the idea that the Secretary of State
had the power to issue warrants that could not be challenged and
reviewed by the judiciary'" or the power to immunize its issuer and
agents from subsequent prosecution.f According to Pratt, the laws
of England did not grant the Secretary such power." Instead, the
Secretary's claim "stands upon a very poor foundation, being in
truth no more than a conjecture of law without authority to support
it.,,67 Similarly, Pratt considered the warrant unlawful because,
even assuming that it was supported by oath, it was executed ex
parte, without notice or a chance to be heard, and executed upon
unknown information and informants, and its execution did not
have to occur in the presence of a constable or the party" These
procedures were especially troubling because, if such a warrant
was issued and executed against an innocent party,
he is as destitute of remedy as the guilty: and the whole
transaction is so guarded against discovery, that if the officer
should be disposed to carry off a bank-bill, he may do it with
impunity, since there is no man capable of proving either the
taker or the thing taken."
Fear of government power and abuse of discretion , therefore , runs
through even the most privacy-centric decision.
It should be apparent, from these examples, that a primary
goal of the Fourth Amendment is the same as that of the entire
Constitution-to define and to limit governmental power. While the

62
63

Entick, 19 Howell's State Trials at 1036-39,95 Eng. Rep. at 811-13.
Id. at 1045.

:' See id. at 1036-38, 95 Eng. Rep. at 811-12.
'See id. at 1041-42, 95 Eng. Rep. at 813-14.
66

See id. at 1057 C'The whole body of the law, if 1 may use the phrase,

were ,as Ignorant at that trme of a pnvy counsellor's right to commit in the case
ofa libel, as the whole body of privy counsellors are at this day.").
67 Id. at 1053.
68
69

Entick, 19 Howell's State Trials at 1064-65 95 Eng. Rep at 807
Id. at 1065.
'.
.
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sanctity of one's home and papers," as well as public disagreement
with the substantive offenses," clearly played an important role in
these early cases, fear of unfettered governmental power resonates
even more clearly. Moreover, to the extent the house and papers
are to be protected, the text of the Amendment and its history
suggest that the protection flows from restraining governmental
discretion even when that discretion is specifically granted by
statute. As Akhil Reed Amar suggests, the Fourth Amendment,
therefore, is concerned with "the agency problem," that is,
"protecting
the
people
generally
from
self-interested
govermnent.v" The Amendment affords this protection not by
defining what is private, but by expressly limiting government's
power to conduct searches." Accordingly, searches must be
reasonable, and warrants may only be issued when supported by
probable cause.74
For the purpose of this discussion, this history is also
important because of what it suggests about how government
discretion and power might be limited. While the Fourth
Amendment speaks of the reasonableness of searches and the
issuing of warrants except upon probable cause in the disjunctive,
the Supreme Court has collapsed the 1:\'10 requirements, creating a
general rule that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable."

70 For example, in the Writs of Assistance Case, James Otis argued that "[a]
man's house is his castle" JAMES OTIS, ADDRESS, in SMITH, supra note 39, at
344. In Entick, Pratt argued that "[p]apers are the owner's goods and chattels:
they are his dearest property; and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they
will hardly bear an inspection." Entick, 19 Howell's State Trials at 1066, 95 Eng.
Rep. at 811.
71 See Stuntz, supra note 36, at 406-07 (arguing that the response to these
decisions can be explained by public opposition to the underlying charges and
offenses).
72 AMAR, supra note 36, at 67-68.
73 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
74Id.
75 See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315
(1972) ("[T]he definition of 'reasonableness' turns, at least in part, on the more
specific commands of the warrant clause"); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
357 (1967) (citations omitted); AMAR, supra note 36, at 68 (citation omitted)
("The modem
Supreme
Court has intentionally
collapsed
the two
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Under this approach, the Supreme Court has made itself the
principal arbiter for deciding which government acts are or are not
reasonable. This interpretation of the Amendment is certainly not
compelled by its history and origins." Instead, the Founders
believed that" 'the people,' " and not judges, were "to protect both
individual persons and the collective people against a possibly
unrepresentati ve and self-serving officialdom." 77
The people
exercised
considerable
power in these
preconstitutional cases because juries, not judges, determined the
reasonableness of a search. As evidenced by Wilkes and Entick, the
people would have an opportunity to evaluate searches in a
common-law action for trespass." As such, "a jury, guided by a
judge in a public trial and able to hear arguments from both sides
of the case, could typically assess the reasonableness
of
government action in an after-the- fact tort suit." 79 As Amar has
argued, in light of this background, it is not hard to imagine that
'the people' were to playa similar role in restraining governmental
power under the Fourth Amendment" Large civil verdicts against
the government agents conducting a search would deter similar
81
behavior in the future. Moreover, once a jury concludes that the
search is unreasonable, the search would be considered unlawful
by definition under the Fourth Amendment.V
Under this regime, warrants were undesirable
"progovernment tool[s].,,83 A lawful warrant effectively immunized the
government agent from liability'" and removed the legality of the

requirements. , .. "); see Amsterdam, supra note 14, at 358 (discussing the few
types of exceptions to the warrant requirement).
76 See AMAR, supra note 36, at 64-77.
77 Id. at 68.
78S
.
ee supra text accompanymg notes 41-49 58-69.
N
'
See AMAR, supra note 36, at 70.
:: ld. ("We can now see the Fourth Amendment with fresh eyes.").
Id. (discussing the deterrent effect of tort actions against government
agents).
82 ld. ("If the properly instructed jury deemed the search unreasonable
the
plain ;yards of the Fourth Amendment would renderthe search unlawful."). '
, Stuntz, supra note 36, at 410 ("Warrants were a pro-government tool,
not a protection for the citizenry.").

" AMAR, supra note 36, at 69 (citation omitted) ("A lawful warrant, in
effect, would compel a sort of directed verdict for the defendant government
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search from the decision-making
authority of the civil jury."
Warrants, therefore, were generally disfavored and viewed with
hostility,
which
explains
why
the
Fourth
Amendment
86
circumscribes,
rather than encourages,
their use.
As Stuntz
argues, this hostility stems from the fact that warrants "transferred
the issue of the legality of the search from the jury ... to a judge or
executive official ... acting both ex parte and ex ante. ,,87 Hostility
towards warrants represented hostility to this shift in power.i" As
Amar documents
in The Bill of Rights, throughout
the ratifying
debates the Founders expressed their belief that this power was
best entrusted in the people as re~resented by the institution of the
jury rather than by the judiciary'
As one essay at the time argued,
if an officer searching
for stolen goods, pulled down the clothes of a bed in which
there was a woman, and searched under her shift ... a trial by
jury would be our safest resource, heavy damage would at once
punish the offender, and deter others from committing the
same: but what satisfaction can we expect from a lordly [judge]
always ready to protect the officers of government against the
weak and helpless citizens ... ?90

official in any subsequent lawsuit for damages."); Stuntz, supra note 36, at 40910 ("A warrant provided an effective defense against a trespass claim because it
established the legality ofthe search, creating a kind oflegal 'safe harbor.' '').
85 AMAR,supra note 36, at 69; Stuntz, supra note 36, at 410.
86
See TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDtES tN CONSTTTUTtONAL
INTERPRETATION
41 (1969) ("Far from looking at the warrant as a protection
against unreasonable searches, they saw it as an authority for unreasonable and
oppressive searches, and sought to confine its issuance and execution in line

with the stringent requirements applicable to common-law warrants for stolen
goods .... ").
87 Stuntz, supra note 36, at410.

SKId.
89 See AMAR,supra note 36, at 74-76. As Professor Amar further notes,
this also meant that state law would play a significant role in protecting
individual liberties. Id. at 76.
90Id at 74 (quoting Essay of a Democratic Federalist, PA.HERALD,Oct.
17, 1787, reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE
ANTT-FEDERALIST
58, 61 (Herbert 1.
Storing ed., 1981)).

888

WIDENER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19

By limiting lawful warrants to only those based "upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation," the Fourth
Amendment protects the people's power to determine the
lawfulness of a search. 91
By emphasizing the importance of the jury at common law, I
do not suggest that the jury is the only appropriate body for
determining the reasonableness of a search, or that the jury
deserves a greater role today." Rather, this discussion illustrates
the importance the Founders placed on having the decision of what
constitutes a reasonable search made by 'the people' rather than by
government officials. And one may clearly argue that for the
Framers, the Constitution, rather than the jury, ultimately became
the primary means for expressing the will of the people.
In light of this history, it should be apparent that the Fourth
Amendment complements the doctrine of separation of powers,
which addresses one of the most perplexing problems of a
government of laws and not of men--ensuring that the power
wielded by the executive branch of government, "whether wielded
by a Prince or a President, is itself governed by and answerable to
the law.,,93 Under American
constitutional
law, this is
accomplished by requiring, at least in the domestic sphere,
executive power to be governed either by the Constitution or by
statute. The executive's domestic role under the Constitution is best
illustrated by the Supreme Court's landmark decision in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer94
In 1951, a labor dispute between steel companies and their
employees threatened steel production during the Korean War95
Believing that a work stoppage would jeopardize the war effort,
President Truman ordered the Secretary of Commerce to take

91

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

This nation and the United States Constitution have undergone
significant changes since the eighteenth century, including the rise of the
professional police force, the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
fact that we are a much larger and more heterogeneous community, weakening
the common law jury as a safeguard.
92

93 1 LAURENCEH. TRJBE, AMERtCANCONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 4-1, at 630
(3d ed. 2000).
94
95

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
ld. at 582-83.
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possession of and to run the steel mills96 The steel companies
argued that the President's order violated the Constitution because
it was not authorized by an act of Congress or by any constitutional
provision." In response, the President argued, inter alia, that he
had the inherent power to issue such an order or, at the very least,
that it was part of his power to "take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed. ,,98 Writing for the Court, Justice Black agreed
with the steel companies and held that "[t]he President's power, if
any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress or
from the Constitution itself.,,99 With respect to the President's
argument that the order was consistent with his power to execute
the laws, Black responded that "[i]n the framework of our
Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws are
faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker." I 00
Instead, the Constitution limits his role to directing "that a
congressional policy be executed in a manner prescribed by
Congress," and the Constitution does not permit him to direct "that
a presidential policy be executed in a manner prescribed by the
President."IOI Because Congress did not authorize the President's
actions, a majority of the Justices concluded that Truman's order
. . I. 102
was unconsntutrona
In his now famous concurring opinion, Justice Jackson argued
that the President claimed a power that "either has no beginning or
it has no end. If it exists, it need submit to no legal restraint.vI"
Recognition of such a power, he argued, would be a step toward
dictatorship and was precisely what the Founders hoped to avoid
by limiting the President's legislative power to recommendation

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 582-84.
Id. at 583-84.
98Id. at 587 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
99 Id. at 585.
100Id. at 587.
101 !d. at 588.
102 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 588-89. In fact, when it
enacted the labor laws the President claimed to be enforcing, Congress had
specifically considered and rejected the idea of giving the President the power to
seize striking facilities. See id. at 656-57 (Burton, J., concurring).
103Id. at 653 (Jackson, 1., concurring).
96

97
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and veto. 104 According to Jackson, "With all its defects, delays and
inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long
preserving free government except that the Executive be under the
·
d e lib
.
,,105
law, and that the law be made by par Iiamentary
I erations,
Similarly, quoting Brandeis, Justice Douglas argued,
"The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted hy the
Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude
the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid
friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the
distribution of the governmental powers among three
departments, to save the people from autocracy."ID6
Thus the doctrine of separation of powers protects against arbitrary
and unfettered executive power by requiring executive decisions to
be governed by either constitutional or statutory law.
It should be apparent that the Fourth Amendment and the
doctrine of separation of powers share the same goal and are
intended to serve the same function. As a complement to the
doctrine of separation of powers, the Fourth Amendment may play
one of two roles. Either the Amendment establishes the minimum
requirements that must be satisfied before the government may
conduct a search when those searches are authorized by statute, or
it guarantees that searches are always regulated by the Constitution
even if they are not specifically authorized by statute.
This brief discussion of the Fourth Amendment's history and
its relationship to the Constitution's separation of powers
highlights two important principles. First, the Fourth Amendment
was not intended as a vehicle to define privacy; rather, like the rest
of the Constitution in general and the doctrine of separation of
powers in particular, it is intended to limit executive power and
discretion. Second, the only legitimate authority for determining
the reasonableness of any exercise of governmental power is the
people themselves through the Constitution or through their
legislative representatives by statute. It should be clear that our

104
105

272

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343
Jd. at 655.

U.S. at 653-55.

106 Jd. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring)(quotingMyers v. United States,
U.S. 52, 293 (1926)).
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current practice-in which school districts decide to use webcams to
spy on students or the President decides to use the NSA to spy on
Americans and judges may entirely exempt such decisions and
searches from the Fourth Amendment
based upon their
understanding of privacy-is absolutely inconsistent with these
principles.
Under the Supreme Court's current interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment, the Constitution plays only a small role in restraining
government power, and the people play virtually no role in
defining the scope of that power. The irony is, of course, that what
the Framers feared was not the invasion of privacy per se, but how
and when those invasions would occur. The Framers were more
concerned about limiting government's power to invade any aspect
of life without sufficient cause than with defining what aspects of
life should be offlimits to government. The Founders also believed
that the people should play a significant role in making this
determination. The Supreme Court's current approach does more
than ignore these concerns-it undermines them. As it stands, the
Supreme Court has transformed the Fourth Amendment from a
constitutional provision delineating the scope of governmental
power generally, as determined by the people, into a provision that
protects only isolated pockets of interests, as determined by judges.
And, once again, privacy is the problem.

